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 Wages and Employment in a Random Social Network with
 Arbitrary Degree Distribution
 By YANNIS M. IOANNIDES AND ADRIAAN R. SOETEVENT
 The notion that social networks in labor mar-
 kets play a critical role is intuitively appealing
 and has attracted attention at least since Mark S.
 Granovetter (1973). The empirical literature has
 shown that reliance on informal methods varies
 across demographic groups, but has not yet
 fully clarified how the pattern of employment
 and earnings payoffs to networks varies across
 groups (loannides and Linda D. Loury, 2004).
 Theoretical advances, including Antoni Calv6-
 Armengol (2004), Scott A. Boorman (1975),
 and Calv6-Armengol and Matthew O. Jackson
 (2004) show that social networks may explain
 salient characteristics of the labor market such
 as positive correlation of employment across
 agents, and time and duration dependence in the
 likelihood of obtaining a job.
 Only about one-third of overall earnings in-
 equality can be explained by individual charac-
 teristics such as gender, education, and age
 (Lawrence F. Katz and David H. Autor, 1999).
 Residual or within-group inequality, which in-
 creased for the United States in the 1980s and
 1990s, has been attributed to search frictions,
 inter alia. Such frictions may cause otherwise
 identical workers to earn different wages (Dale
 T. Mortensen, 2003).
 This paper shows that, on average, workers
 who are better connected socially experience
 lower unemployment rates and receive higher
 wages. It represents social connections in the
 labor market by a random graph, with nodes as
 individuals and edges as connections. The num-
 ber of others with which each individual is
 connected, the "degree," obeys an arbitrary
 probability distribution. This paper extends pre-
 vious research that in some cases assumes
 complete networks (everyone connected to
 everyone else) and in other cases balanced net-
 works (everyone connected to an equal number
 of others) (cf. Calv6-Armengol and Yves Ze-
 nou, 2005, C-A&Z below).
 I. Job Matching in a Random Social Network
 We follow Christopher A. Pissarides (2000), as
 adapted by C-A&Z, and consider a large number
 of workers who ex ante have identical job perfor-
 mance. Similarly, firms have identical productiv-
 ity. At the beginning of each discrete time period,
 each worker may receive information about a job
 opening directly from an employer, with proba-
 bility equal to the vacancy rate, v. Jobs break up at
 the conclusion of each period with constant prob-
 ability 8. If a worker is employed when the job
 opening information arrives, she passes it on to a
 randomly selected unemployed acquaintance. If
 none of her acquaintances is unemployed, the
 information is lost. Thus, unemployed workers
 receive job information either directly or indi-
 rectly. Newly employed workers go through a
 one-period probation, during which their earn-
 ings are equal to yo, which without loss of
 generality is set equal to 0. In the following
 period, workers' productivity becomes y, > 0
 and stays at that level for the duration of em-
 ployment. Thus, newly employed workers have
 no incentive to use new job openings to increase
 their current wage. Employers have perfect in-
 formation about workers' social connections
 when wage bargaining takes place.
 Agents are matched with other workers by
 being embedded in an exogenous, but random,
 social network. Unlike C-A&Z, workers differ
 with respect to the number, k, of other workers
 each is in contact with: k, a worker's degree, has
 a frequency distribution function denoted by
 P = (Po, P9 Pk, ...). Having more links is
 better but not necessarily socially efficient, as
 C-A&Z show, because vacancies may not be
 filled due to coordination failure. We show that
 * Ioannides: Department of Economics, Tufts University,
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 (e-mail: yannis.ioannides@tufts.edu); Soetevent: School of
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 this result is sensitive to the nature of the social
 network, e.g., in the case of a Poisson degree
 distribution, the monotonicity of matching is
 effectively restored.
 A property of our model is noteworthy. The
 probability that a particular worker, chosen ran-
 domly from a given worker's contacts, is con-
 nected with k other workers is not equal to Pk
 (Mark E. J. Newman, 2003). A worker with m
 other contacts is m times more likely to be
 reached than a worker with one contact. So, the
 degree distribution of a worker thus selected is
 fk - kpkYj jpj. This connection bias is concep-
 tually akin to length-biased sampling in unem-
 ployment statistics.
 Connection bias allows us to derive that a
 randomly chosen social contact of a typical




 q(i, p, u) = E{(1 - uk)[l - (1 - k]
 iuEk(k)
 where the probability for one's contacts to be
 unemployed may depend on the number of their
 own contacts j, ui, and write u = (u0, u1,...).
 The probability for a worker with A contacts to
 receive job opening information through her
 social contacts is given by
 (2) P(A, u, v, p, u)= 1 - [1 - vq]A.
 This probability is increasing with the covari-
 ance between a worker's employment rate and
 the unemployment rate of a worker's contacts.
 The larger this covariance, the lower the prob-
 ability that an unemployed individual would
 hear from her social contacts about job open-
 ings. The higher the mean unemployment rate,
 the less important is the effect from the contacts
 of one's own contacts, because they are, them-
 selves, more likely to need the information.
 The properties of probability function P(A, u,
 v, p, u) are discussed in the remainder of this
 paper for a special case of (1), when each per-
 son assumes her contacts' unemployment rates
 are equal to the mean unemployment. This
 probability is, (a) increasing and concave in the
 number of a worker's contacts; (b) decreasing in
 the mean unemployment rate in the economy;
 and (c) increasing in the vacancy rate. In con-
 trast to C-A&Z (2005), and loannides and
 Soetevent (2005) (I&S) show that the function
 P(O)'s being convex in ui over some range de-
 pends on whether one's own number of contacts
 does not exceed a threshold value, which itself
 increases with the mean degree.
 The Job-Matching Function.-Defining the
 expected probability for a worker to hear of a
 vacancy either directly or indirectly as the job
 matching function, m(u, v, p) = IL= pux[v +
 (1 - v)P(A, -, v, p)], we may write the rate at
 which vacancies are filled as
 (3) e(u, v, p) = - pAuh(A, u, v, p)
 v
 where h(A, ui, v, p) - v + (1 - v)P(A, u, v, p)
 stands for the probability that an unemployed
 worker with A contacts hears of a vacancy.
 Proposition 2 (I&S, 2005) proves that the prob-
 ability a worker hears of a vacancy is increasing
 in ux and is increasing and strictly concave in
 the vacancy rate.
 II. Labor Market Equilibrium
 By adapting the Pissarides model as modified
 by C-A&Z, we work with the associated Bellman
 equations at the steady state for IF, the intertem-
 poral profit for a job being filled by a worker with
 A contacts, and for Iv, the expected value of open-
 ing a vacancy at the beginning of a typical period.
 In our case, the profit of a filled job depends,
 through the wage rate, w1, on the number of
 contacts held by a worker who fills the job:
 (4) IF = yw -
 1
 + + r [(1 - 6)IF + 8Iv], VA;
 1 - (u, v, p)
 (5) Iv - + r
 F 1
 + e(u, v, p) yo - wo + 1 + r
 X ((1 - 6)Eg(x)[I] + +Iv)
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 where the expectation is taken with respect to
 g(A), a probability distribution function that is
 specified as follows. To account for connection
 bias--this time with regard to firms with vacan-
 cies being more likely to be filled by agents with
 more links-the expectation is taken with respect
 to the probability distribution function
 p ux h(A, u, v, p)
 (6) g(A; u, v, p) = m(u,v,p) m(u, v, p)
 Equilibrium with free entry implies that the
 value to firms of opening a vacancy is driven
 down to 0, Iv = 0. Solving for IF yields: I^F =
 (Y, - wl,)(1 + r)/(r + 8). That is, the value of
 filling a vacancy is equal to the expected present
 value of a flow of net profit, adjusted for the
 probability of breakup. The labor demand equa-
 tion is
 r+8
 (7) Eg()[(yI - w,)1 (u, v, p)] = 1 - 1 - 8
 That is, the expected rate of profit per vacancy
 filled is equal to the amortized fixed costs of
 hiring, adjusted for the likelihood of jobs'
 breaking up.
 A. Wages
 Turning to the labor supply side, we index, by
 A, the expected lifetime income of an employed
 and an unemployed worker at the beginning of
 a period and before vacancies are posted, I, and
 I , respectively. The Bellman equations at the
 steady state imply that the gain for an unem-
 ployed worker with A contacts from accepting
 employment is
 1+r
 r + + (1 - 8)h(A, u, v, p)
 The wage rate, wl, is determined from a Nash
 bargain, in which workers' power is denoted by
 0 E [0, 1]. The wage rate maximizes (IE - I)u
 x (IF - Iv)l-) . This yields a wage-rate schedule,
 conditional on the number of contacts by a
 worker:
 (8)
 = P3(r + 8) + 3(1 - 8)h(A, u, v, p)
 i r+ 5 + p(1 - 8)h(A, Ui, v, p) YI'
 I  follows that a worker may extract a better bar-
 gain the more contacts she has. Th s is reflected in
 the wage bargain via the probability that an un-
 employed worker hears of a vacancy through the
 social structure. The greater a worker's bargaining
 power, 0, the higher is the wage rate.
 B. Steady-State Labor Market Equilibrium
 Job creation and job destruction are assumed
 to take place as follows. At the beginning of
 each period, some of the unemployed find jobs.
 At the end of each period, employed workers,
 including newly hired and incumbent employ-
 ees, lose their jobs because jobs break up ran-
 domly, with probability 6. At the steady state
 for each type of worker, the flow into unem-
 ployment from the breakup of jobs, 6p,(1 -
 ux), equals the flow into employment because of
 job taking, (1 - 8)pxuxh(A, ui, v, p). We thus
 arrive at individual Beveridge curves, one for
 each worker type:
 6
 (9) uA =AVA.
 8 + (1 - 8)h(A, u, v, p)'
 This implies an inverse relationship between un-
 employment and vacancy rates. Workers with
 more social contacts incur lower unemployment
 rates.
 A steady-state equilibrium of this economy
 must satisfy the labor demand equations, the
individual Beveridge equations, and the wage
 functions, (7-9). It is sufficient, however, to find
 equilibrium values of the unemployment rates
 for all worker types and the vacancy rate: (u*,
 v*). Using (8) in (7) and recalling the definition
 of the function h(.) yields a condition for the equilibrium vacancy rate
 (10)
 [r ) v  p)] V + 8 + P(1 - 8)[v + (1 - v)P(A, i, v, p)]
 (1 - 3)(1 - 5)
 I&S give sufficient conditions, in terms of an
 upper bound for the job breakup probability
 as a function of all parameters of the model
 and of a lower bound that involves endoge-
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 FIGURE 1. WAGE DISPERSION WHEN THE DEGREE
 DISTRIBUTION IS POISSON, Pk = e-Ok/k! Vk; 0 = 3 (o);
 0 = 5 (*); 0 = 10 (+) and 0 = 20 (.)
 FIGURE 2. UNEMPLOYMENT DISTRIBUTION WHEN THE
 DEGREE DISTRIBUTION IS POISSON, Pk = e-Ok/k! Vk;
 0 = 3 (o); 0 = 5 (*); 0 = 10 (+) and 0 = 20 ()
 nous variables, for existence and uniqueness
 of the labor market equilibrium given any
 degree distribution p.
 C. Numerical Results for Poisson Degree
 Distributions
 We calibrate the model for Poisson degree
 distributions and with other parameters cho-
 sen, following Frangois Fontaine (2005). We
 find that as the network becomes denser
 (greater mean degree), mean unemployment
 falls and mean wage rate increases. Unem-
 ployment and wage rates of the least con-
 nected workers are adversely affected by
 increases in overall network density (see Fig-
 ures 1 and 2). The average unemployment rate
 among workers without connections is three
 to four times as large as the unemployment
 rate of the most well connected. The wage
 rates of the latter are 15 percent to 25 percent
 higher. The equilibrium vacancy rate falls
 with network density because of the higher
 wage rates firms have to pay due to workers'
 increased bargaining power. Interestingly, the
 matching function monotonically increases
 with network density. This is in contrast to
 C-A&Z, who identify a critical network den-
 sity above which matching declines. So, at
 least with random graphs with Poisson distri-
 butions, the monotonicity of the Pissarides
 matching function is restored (see I&S for full
 details).
 III. Conclusions
 In our model, wage dispersion is generated
 by differences in the number of contacts work-
 ers have with other workers. We contrast by
 briefly considering closely related previous lit-
 erature. Mortensen and Tara Vishwanath (1994)
 obtain wage dispersion because job offers ob-
 tained through referrals from employed social
 contacts are higher than those received directly
 from employers. Unlike our model, theirs does
 not incorporate competition for job-related in-
 forma ion among an informed worker's social
 contacts, nor does it deal with workers' social
 networks. Variation in the number of links be-
 tween firms and workers is emphasized by
 Kenneth J. Arrow and Ron Borzekowski
 (2004). They use simulations to show that 15
 perc nt of the variation in wages may be ex-
 plained by the number of ties between firms and
 workers. Fontaine (2005) models the evolution
 of employment and wages in a complete social
 network. He shows, by simulation, that stochas-
tic matching leads to a stationary distribution
 that is associated with significant wage differ-
 en ials among otherwise identical workers.
 Samuel Bentolila et al. (2004) test a Pissarides-
 style matching model that trades off higher pro-
 ductivity in the "formal" economy against an
effect of personal contacts in shortening unem-
 ployment spells at the cost of a lower wage rate.
 Using U.S. and European Union data, they find
 a wage discount of 3 percent to 5 percent for
 jobs found through personal contacts. Their
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 regressions control for industries and occupa-
 tions, and for measures of cognitive ability and
 own demographic characteristics. They attribute
 the wage discount to occupational mismatch.
 Research that allows for individual background
 characteristics to influence connectedness and
 combines with referrals, workers' links to firms,
 and assortative matching deserves attention in
 the future.
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